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ANGOLA 2006: A BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY VISIT
In 2006 the author acted as interpreter for a small party of  British politicians 
who visited Angola. His own account of  the expedition highlighted the then 
prominent questions of  agriculture and rural development, of  the empowerment 
of  women in urban communities, of  perceptions of  national identity and the 
role of  electoral politics. The effect of  rising and falling oil wealth on legitimate 
investment and on corrupt embezzlement had to be delicately addressed as did 
the balance between presidential power and opposition newspapers. To many 
Angolans the thriving Pentecostal churches seemed as important in their daily 
lives as the non-governmental development agencies or the cash-strapped govern-
ment ministries of  health and education. In 2006 the first signs of  China’s new 
interest in Africa were beginning to match the entrepreneurial dominance of  
Brazil and Portugal and eclipse the regional aspirations of  South Africa.
Angola 2006: Une visite parlementaire britannique
En 2006, l’auteur a servi d’interprète à un petit groupe de parlementaires britan-
niques qui s’est rendu en Angola. Son compte rendu de mission soulignait les 
questions alors primordiales de l’agriculture et du développement rural, des droits 
des femmes dans les communautés urbaines, de la perception de l’identité natio-
nale et du rôle de la politique électorale. Il a fallu aborder la question de l’effet 
de la hausse et de la baisse de la richesse pétrolière sur les investissements légi-
times et sur la corruption et le détournement de fonds avec beaucoup de déli-
catesse, tout comme l’équilibre entre le pouvoir présidentiel et les journaux 
d’opposition. Pour de nombreux Angolais, les églises pentecôtistes prospères 
semblaient aussi importantes dans leur vie quotidienne que les agences de dével-
oppement non gouvernementales ou les ministères gouvernementaux de la santé 
et de l’éducation à court d’argent. En 2006, les premiers signes du nouvel inté-
rêt de la Chine pour l’Afrique commençaient à rivaliser avec la prédominance 
entrepreneuriale du Brésil et du Portugal, et à éclipser les aspirations régionales 
de l’Afrique du Sud.
Angola 2006: Uma Visita Parlamentar Britânica
Em 2006, o autor serviu de intérprete a um pequeno grupo de políticos Britânicos, 
que estavam de visita a Angola. O seu próprio relatório da viajém destacava as 
questões, então, proeminentes, no domínio da agricultura e do desenvolvimento 
rural, da promoção do estatuto da mulher, no seio das comunidades urbanas, 
da percepção da identidade nacional e do papel da política eleitoral. Foi neces-
sário abordar, de maneira bastante cuidadosa, a questão do efeito das subidas e 
descidas da riqueza petrolífera sobre os investimentos legítimos e sobre a cor-
rupção e os desvios de fundos, bem como o equilíbrio entre o poder presidencial 
e os jornais da oposição. Para muitos Angolanos, as prósperas igrejas Pentecostais 
pareciam ser tão importantes no seu quotidiano como as agências de desenvol-
vimento não-governamentais ou os ministérios governamentais da Saúde e da 
Educação desprovidos de dinheiro. Em 2006, os sinais do novo interesse da China 
por África começavam a questionar o domínio empresarial do Brasil e de Portugal 
e a eclipsar as aspirações regionais da África do Sul.
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In 2006 a small party of  British politicians visited Angola. Their perception of  the country’s post-war development requirements will make an interesting baseline from which to measure 
national success and failure over the following three years. The questions they explored ranged 
extremely widely over issues of  municipal governance, provincial devolution, child protection, 
peasant farming, Chinese investment, economic transparency and other issues highlighted in this 
unofficial paper written at the time, that is three years ago, by the team’s British guide and 
interpreter. Being politicians the visitors were naturally interested in elections. Their enthusiasm, 
as this paper hints, was not matched at the time by all Angolans, many of  whom remembered 
the brutal urban warfare which broke out after the parliamentary and presidential elections of  
September 1992. Debate focussed at the time on two issues. One was whether it was possible, 
in a country some of  whose population lived in under-administered and inaccessible provinces, 
to honestly register voters in a comprehensive fashion. The other was whether the electoral com-
mission should risk another winner-takes-all election for the presidency or whether it should limit 
the electoral exercise merely to the choosing of  a new parliament. In the event the registration 
of  voters appeared to be carried out with reasonable efficacy and probity. On the other hand the 
decision was cautiously made, as anticipated, not to risk putting up for election a president who 
had been in post since 1979 and had been elected with a slightly less than absolute majority 
in 1992. A potential crisis such as that which broke out in Kenya, or in Zimbabwe, where 
electors attempted to change not only the composition of  parliament but also the real holder of  
power in the presidential office, was averted in Angola. Avoiding a winner-takes-all election with 
the presidency at stake lowered the electoral temperature while at the same time giving Angolans 
an opportunity to vote, to feel that they were real citizens, to begin to sense ownership of  their 
society. The most prominent leader of  the defeated opposition accepted with equanimity the 
September 2008 election result which gave the government some 80 per cent of  the votes. He 
reassured his followers that democracy would continue to grow in strength and that another 
opportunity to vote would occur at the next election. The scale of  the parliamentary victory by 
the ruling party may even have encouraged the palace to think that a presidential election might 
not be as risky as the courtiers associated with the ruling dynasty had feared.1
July 2009
The Question of  Election
The first question which any political visitor to Angola will ask of  his or her hosts 
is “how are the plans for a general election proceeding?”. The technical answers 
come from a variety of  foreign agencies anxious to facilitate the complex task of  
registering voters in a land without a census in which about four million people 
have had to flee from war, often leaving all forms of  identity document to burn 
in their abandoned homes. Creating a new register is supposed to be undertaken 
between November 2006 and May 2007 but as an opposition spokesman pointed 
out this was largely a rainy season in which most mud paths and tracks will be 
impassable. Since the 2002 ceasefire elections have always been “two years down 
1 The official All-Party Parliamentary Group for Angola. Observations and Recommendations on a Visit 
to Angola in September 2006 was published by Chatham House, London, and was a sequel to a 
report relating to a similar visit in May 2003. The present author wishes to thank Elizabeth 
Donnelly and Manuel Paulo, of  Chatham House, who made this parliamentary visit not only 
possible but also enjoyable.
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the line” and at the moment that is still the common opinion. Debates about the 
election so far have had more to do with the hours of  opening of  polling stations 
than with the questions of  substance such as should parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections be sequential (as the government will probably decide) or simultane-
ous (as the opposition expects and prefers).
Technicalities are not the only problem. Elections in Angola generate fear. The 
one and only general election ever held in Angola, in September 1992, was fol-
lowed by terrible bloodshed and the half  of  the population old enough to remem-
ber that far off  day still shudders. Indeed, in some communities people are not 
yet rebuilding their homes with permanent materials as they are “waiting for the 
elections”. In 1992 the winners, rightly anticipating that the losers would go back 
to war in the restless provinces that had so long been economically neglected, had 
trained up an urban paramilitary force to root out and kill opposition sympathi-
sers in the city. The country exploded and two years of  slaughter and destruction 
exceeded anything witnessed in either the colonial war of  1961 to 1974 or the 
war of  international intervention of  1975 to 1991. The return of  such violence 
after a new winner-takes-all election remains an anxiety down in the slums and 
up on the farms.
A return to war is not likely, though the possibility should perhaps not be ruled 
out while rural rebirth remains so slow and urban poverty remains so acute. The 
peace of  Bicesse in 1991 was not a truly indigenous settlement between the two 
armed sets of  economically ambitious bourgeois politicians of  the highland and 
the coastland but rather a ceasefire imposed by Russia and America at the end 
of  their Cold War. It did not share out the political opportunities and the eco-
nomic spoils equitably and was therefore never likely to last, though foreigners 
at the time did not perceive the weaknesses. The peace of  Lusaka in 1994 was 
an equally foreign attempt to end the civil war but the leader of  the opposition 
did not even turn up to sign the accord so ashamed he was of  having to pause 
in his search for power through the barrel of  a gun. The Luena peace of  2002, 
by contrast, was an internal political agreement, signed not far from the grave 
of  Unita’s totalitarian dictator in a land at the end of  the earth which the gov-
ernment had scorched into submission. Surviving officers of  the opposition were 
now able to join those who had changed sides five years earlier to seek fame 
and fortune in the cities of  the oil-rich coast. They negotiated minimal resettle-
ment grants of  tools, utensils and small cash payments for their demobilised 
guerrillas.
The peace of  the Luena protocol now needs to be sustained. Angola’s popula-
tion now needs to see the benefits of  peace, the economic dividends of  peace. 
The restitution of  lost assets, the psychiatric rehabilitation of  child soldiers, the 
repair of  broken communities, all need to be tackled. One civil society worker 
described the great fear as the fear of  neglect. Once the government has garnered 
the votes it might assume it has received a mandate to pursue existing policies 
with impunity. For those Angolans who have not yet seen the dividends of  peace, 
elections could lead to quite dangerous disappointments.
A more enthusiastic attitude to elections comes from existing parliamentarians, 
both those who have joined the unequal “coalition” of  national unity and from 
the tiny “irritant” parties of  whom ten hold 20 seats between them (as compared 
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to the 200 held by the MPLA and the 70 by Unita). No dispassionate observer 
seems to think that an election would be likely to significantly alter this balance 
of  power, but the government does seem reluctant to test the matter. Wealth and 
influence depend on climbing aboard the establishment bandwagon and opposition 
parties have but a single declared platform, to oppose the personalities but not 
the policies of  the current regime. Visitors could detect no policy differences 
between government and opposition parties, merely leadership differences and 
some regional bids for access to the central pork barrel.
Lethargy is much more widespread than vivaciousness among prospective vot-
ers. Some, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, say officially that they will register as 
electors if  they are required to do so but that they will not vote. One of  the 
questions asked, but not answered, is whether the faithful who flock to the new 
Brazilian-run and American-funded Pentecostal churches mushrooming all over 
Luanda will take part in the election. On the Sunday before our visit the Universal 
Church of  the Kingdom of  God had rented both of  the main city stadia for 
prayer meetings (one holding 80,000 adherents and the other 20,000) while the 
Catholics had organised a pilgrimage in busses, cars and even helicopters to take 
70,000 people to the shrine of  Our Lady of  Muxima in a seventeenth-century 
chapel on the far side of  the Kwanza River. Religious ceremonies, and their pow-
ers of  healing, are of  far great importance to ordinary men and women in the 
street that any election. Stories of  miracle cures in the evangelical stadium get 
press coverage while the Papal Nuncio tells proud Catholics that the “miracles” 
performed by the late Father Leonardo Sikufinde in the remote Cunene province 
are being checked by the Vatican with a view to canonising the first Angolan 
saint. In such an atmosphere it seems unlikely that the ordinary punter will flock 
to the polls as he and she did in 1992. Only middle-class intellectuals talk of  an 
election as putting the seal of  legitimacy on peace, though the Minister for 
Territorial Administration did courteously ask his British parliamentary guests for 
help in planning Angola’s elections. Election advisory organisations in both the 
United States and South Africa do, however, already seem to have one toe on 
the ground in readiness to help.
Unita and MPLA
The only opposition party with any substantial presence in parliament, and in the 
quasi-power-sharing government, is Unita. The delegation was unable to meet the 
party president but we were cordially received in the small party headquarters up 
a dusty blind alley in one of  the Luanda municipalities. We had been warned 
that it was difficult to pin Unita spokespersons down to discussing issues – “the 
opposition is a policy-free zone” we were jocularly advised – and sure enough the 
only topic that the vice-president wanted to talk about was the holding of  elec-
tions and election timetables. Unita is very proud of  the fact that its new leader, 
Samakuva, was elected by a party congress whereas the MPLA leader has been 
in post unchallenged since 1979.
The traditional heartland of  Unita support is on the central highland. We were 
shown one of  the bunkers from which Jonas Savimbi commanded his platoons 
during the civil wars. The site is marked by a parked tank rusting in the grounds 
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of  the veterinary school. We drove past the city offices of  Unita but they appeared 
very closed, perhaps because we had arrived on yet another bank holiday. Not 
everyone remembers Unita with much fondness, however, and one attempt at 
political mobilisation led to party militants being drummed out of  town. The 
great fear of  many old enough to remember 1992 is that whoever loses the next 
election will take a leaf  out of  Unita’s book and try to reverse the result by force 
of  arms as happened after the last election. Nowhere on our travels did we meet 
much enthusiasm for another attempt at an election, particularly a first past the 
post, winner takes all, election.
For some, at least, of  the old Unita generals gaining access to the free-market 
band-wagon is a more important priority, and a better way to wealth-sharing if  
not power-sharing, than trying to mount an election. Unita, and to a lesser extent 
MPLA, is essentially an old fashioned single-platform liberation movement and 
when independence had been achieved the only issue was who was going to be 
the president replacing the plumed governor-general of  colonial days. Elections 
in Africa tend to be beauty contests rather than debating forums. In some ways 
Angola is very un-African and political culture tends rather to mimic Portugal 
and Brazil, but the cult of  personality is nevertheless deeply entrenched and framed 
portraits of  the president in his prime ornament every government office.
The facilities available to the MPLA are much more palatial than those of  its 
opponent. The shiny multi-storey party headquarters in Luanda were allegedly 
given to the country by Tito of  Yugoslavia. The spokesperson who received us 
said that 1,100 people worked for the party there but on a part-time basis so that 
their salaries were paid for by other institutions and did not become a burden to 
the party itself. What all these people did was far from obvious and preparing 
for an imminent general election did not seem to be on the agenda.
–  “Oh, yes we have everything arranged for the voter registration which will 
begin in November and be completed by May 2007, no sweat.
–  Then, why will the election not take place in 2007?
–  Oh that will not be possible because voter registration will take place during 
the rainy seasons when the roads are closed so there may be serious delays 
in voter registration.
–  And will the presidentials take place at the same time as the parliamentary 
election?
–  Oh we have yet to decide that.”
Urgency and consistency seemed lacking.
Broadcasting, Publishing and the Media
Members of  parliament in Britain are addicted news junkies. They naturally took 
a keen interest in the media scene in Angola. On the highlands, in Angola’s 
second city of  Huambo formerly known as New Lisbon, news is scarce. The 
national government is so fearful that disaffection in underdeveloped rural provinces 
might once more lead to peasant wars such as those seen in the 1980s, that it 
has effectively forbidden any broadcasting by independent radio stations. In the 
far south, at Lubango, beyond the range of  the civil war, one local radio does 
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operate, and another broadcasts to the ancient coastal city of  Benguela. The most 
important independent radio, however, is the Roman Catholic Radio Ecclesia. 
Despite heavy investment in provincial studios and FM repeaters, for which the 
British government gave some financial help, the Angolan government has banned 
their use. When Radio Ecclesia tried to experiment with its relay station in Huambo 
it was closed down by the police within a week, presumably on the orders of  the 
presidential palace in Luanda.
The highland development agencies – with a little Swiss funding and know-
how – have facilitated the publication of  a ten-page monthly “news bulletin” with 
a circulation of  3,000 in one of  the city municipalities of  Huambo. The content 
is fairly moralistic and the news tends to be family-oriented (commune welcomes 
safe delivery of  triplets to proud local mother) but any news is so scarce that the 
bulletin is passed from hand to hand around the whole district and indeed beyond. 
The independent but very expensive newspapers of  Luanda, of  which more below, 
do not reach the provinces and even the bi-monthly news magazine put out by 
the Catholic Church appears to have a limited rural distribution.
One issue of  great interest to the visiting parliamentarians was the place of  
women in the spectrum of  power and politics in Angola. By serendipitous good 
fortune one of  the independent newspapers, the Angolense now in its seventh year 
of  publication, carried a front page article on the day of  our arrival which dis-
cussed the pecking order of  the ten most influential female entrepreneurs in the 
country. The top spot was held by Ana Paula dos Santos, the wife of  the state 
president. In second place came Isabel dos Santos, the British-educated daughter 
of  the president’s first – Russian – wife. She has long been a major player in the 
field of  diamond marketing and it may have been in part to protect her interests 
that Angola signed up to the Kimberly process of  diamond verification in a De 
Beers-led attempt to stop “blood diamonds” from bringing gems into disrepute. 
More recently Isabel has been very active in the field of  telecommunication invest-
ments. Third place is held by Albina Assis, a member of  one of  the grand old 
Luanda families. She once held the key post of  minister of  petroleum and is the 
only woman to serve on the president’s privy council.
Another insight into the role of  women arose when the British delegation were 
invited to visit the ministry of  foreign affairs. They were received by Mademoiselle 
Neto, the daughter of  Agostinho Neto who had once been Amnesty’s first prisoner 
of  conscience and the honorary president (in incarcerated absentia) of  the MPLA. 
On his release he became the commander-in-chief  and paymaster-general of  
MPLA’s guerrillas and on 11 November 1975 emerged as the country’s first state 
president. His daughter, although not a member of  the thirteen families that have 
reigned over Angolan high society for the last dozen or so generations, is now a 
vice-minister is the Dos Santos government. This seemed the ideal occasion for 
a media photo opportunity but the British delegation was eclipsed by a more 
important delegation from Equatorial Guinea which was visiting on the same 
day.2
2 The quotations in this article are culled from the weekly Luanda newspapers of  16 September 
2006.
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Microcredit and the Dynamism of  Informality
The informal economy of  Angola is probably the most dynamic in the world. 
One example of  this was witnessed in the São Paulo district of  Huambo city. 
Under the Portuguese the district was one of  the city’s two industrial zones but 
the expatriate managers fled the country in July 1975 at the approach of  the 
western armies of  intervention, dressed in the apartheid fatigues of  the South 
African army. Local people, deprived of  their colonial wages and terrified of  the 
insecurities of  war, turned on the factories and warehouses and robbed them of  
their stock, their furniture, their plant, and any moveable items that might con-
ceivably have a marketable value. Recovery was very slow and in 1992 the area 
was once more in the eye of  the whirlwind. A dismayed party of  opposition, 
Unita, had been assured by the United States that if  it laid down its arms and 
took part in an election supervised by the United Nations it was bound to win 
the power which its leader had craved ever since his student days in Switzerland. 
The American advice proved to be wrong, however, and the majority of  Angola’s 
people feared the populist Jonas Savimbi even more than they feared the techno-
cratic Eduardo dos Santos. The enraged psychopath took his revenge on the city 
of  Huambo with heavy artillery during a third civil war. And still the people, 
served by their informal economy, survived.
In August 2006, three weeks before the British parliamentary delegation visited 
the city, the urban planners of  the ruling party – steeped in the tidy-minded 
bureaucratic traditions of  Portugal – decided that the seething and teeming hun-
dred-acre market of  Huambo city was an eyesore. Never mind the struggling 
people, the daily shoppers, the war-time survivors, the market-garden retailers, the 
textile saleswomen, the children earning their school fees by selling sticks of  chew-
ing gum, the market was bulldozed and all that remained for the visitors to see 
was the occasional plume of  smoke arising from the ashes.
An association of  market women, supported by a microcredit scheme supervised 
by the Development Workshop, was asked to comment. Well, they said, there was 
some hullabaloo – confusão – and instead of  walking to market every morning we 
had to pay the fares on the VW microbuses to the new market-site five kilometres 
out of  town. “But we mobilised ourselves, we arranged a network of  informal 
satellite markets throughout the city and near to our customers”. Mere politicians 
will never be able to keep Angola’s market women down and those customers 
whom we met confirmed that after three weeks of  confusion transport, distribution 
and supplies were almost back to normal. Most of  those participating in the 
microcredit project are women. Women came to shoulder heavy economic respon-
sibilities as well as the family ones when caught up in the wars. Their responsi-
bilities seem not to have lessened and yet there remain many barriers hindering 
the participation of  women in institutionalised political and economic life.
Members of  the DW microcredit union were asked for their experience of  the 
agency. “We can get loans of  up to one thousand dollars to set up small busi-
nesses.” One woman had set up an import business for spare parts – very neces-
sary in a city where the roads are shot to hell and virtually all the municipal 
busses land up in the corporation graveyard after barely two years of  service, and 
all for want of  spares. Other women went into more traditional pursuits such as 
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retail clothing, thriving on a credit system in which interest rates are a mere three 
per cent. But how, asked our MPs, is repayment guaranteed. Ah, was the reply, 
we belong to lodges of  a dozen or so members each and the system is self  
regulating. None of  us can afford to let a fellow member default and bring the 
system down. And when it comes to an election will you vote Unita or MPLA. 
“Oh, I shall vote for the Development Workshop.”
Once more the question arises as to for how long will the system need the 
umbrella of  an international agency to ensure probity and protection from those 
who might like to “formalise” the profitable retail sector of  the economy. It is 
good question. The advice we were given is that the next three years will be 
crucial in deciding if  Angola comes out of  its post-civil-war trauma with a vibrant 
and confident civil society or whether disillusion will creep in and political insta-
bility break out. Development Workshop officers are optimistic and think that the 
microcredit schemes they have initiated are now ready to stand on their own feet. 
One KixiCredito microfinance group will be independent of  international donor 
support by 2007.
Sita José fiddles while Rome burns
On 20 September 2006 the Jornal de Angola, the government-owned daily, ran a 
double-spread photograph of  the Giant Sable Antelope. The photograph was an 
old colonial one, belonging to the days when Portugal hoped that one day Angola 
might become a tourist destination and its very rare antelope was the poster 
symbol of  imperial pride. The dream lives on and Sita José, minister for planning, 
land tenure and urbanisation, was hosting an international conference on sable 
antelopes in the little up-country town of  Malange at the head of  Luanda’s rick-
ety Victorian railway. It was long assumed that the last giant sable had been eaten 
during the fourth civil war of  1998-2002 when the armies of  each of  the libera-
tion movements (which stand in lieu of  political parties) tried to starve out their 
opponents. Famished conscripts had survived on anything from bush meat to wild 
honey. Since the war ended it is alleged that one baby sable has been seen, or 
even that a herd of  thirty animals has been filmed by scholars associated with 
the Catholic University of  Luanda.
The minister, meanwhile, is at the heart of  the planning exercise which aspires 
to return Angola to the tidy-mindedness of  yesteryear. On a recent visit to London 
he laid out his vision for cities in which everything is neatly zoned, a bit like the 
pale, bloodless, soulless, city of  Brasilia a thousand miles up-country from the 
vibrancy of  Rio de Janeiro across the Atlantic waters from Luanda. People do 
not feature in the new Angolan plans and neither does economic reality. The 
ministry does not recognise that Angola is almost the poorest country in the world, 
lying as it does at the bottom of  the Human Development Index with a 260 per 
thousand child mortality statistic. Angola can only survive the next decade by 
nurturing its wonderfully dynamic and flexible informal economy which has its 
own codes of  conduct and rules of  engagement. And Angola’s people will only 
invest in the future if  their assets of  land and housing are guaranteed quickly 
and efficiently rather than threatened by new concepts of  territorial zoning and 
planning.
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Chinese neo-imperialism
We were advised that we should see Chinese “swarming” everywhere in Angola 
but we actually saw few Chinese at work since our week was hit by two bank 
holidays – the birthday of  the poet-president who led Angola to independence in 
1975 and died in 1979, and the 94th anniversary of  the highland workshops of  
the Benguela Railway which later hosted the garden city of  Huambo. We did not 
fail, however, to ask about the dramatic new phenomena which the Chinese arrival 
represented. In Huambo one of  our British parliamentarians was temporarily 
taken ill and a Chinese fellow guest at the inn kindly suggested that we take him 
to the clinic.
–  “Do you mean the provincial hospital which is being refurbished by Chinese 
technicians and civil engineers?
–  No, no, no, I mean the private clinic run by the Angolan National Oil 
Company and to which all middle class people go for proficient but very 
expensive treatment.”
Chinese charm impersonated . . . The return of  the Chinese to Central Africa is 
quite largely linked to the need to rebuild the infrastructure of  transport with all 
speed. In the nineteenth-century the French used Chinese workers to build the 
Congo railways to Brazzaville while the British preferred Indian labour to initiate 
the building of  the Benguela railway to the Belgian copperbelt. Chinese engineers, 
navvies and capital are now being used not only to rebuild the Benguela railway 
– in the hope of  linking Huambo to the ocean during the course of  2007 – but 
also to re-open the Luanda railway through the old coffee groves of  the forest 
zone. Even more dramatically the Chinese civil engineers hope to rebuild the road 
network linking north and south and put in new bridges which can carry heavy-
duty trucks.
One problem of  the Chinese programme is that it will create very few new 
jobs for Angolans who suffer from acute levels of  unemployment and underem-
ployment. The contracts specify that 70 per cent of  the input of  staff  and capi-
tal shall be Chinese and only 30 per cent local. When leaders of  Unita were 
asked about the Chinese programme they said “we love it; if  anything can cause 
the MPLA to lose the next election it is the dismay caused by seeing Chinese 
labourers doing jobs which Angolans would be perfectly capable of  doing”. The 
matter, however, is not quite as simple as that. The productivity of  the Chinese 
road gangs is very high. By contrast one Angolan building team to whom we 
talked consisted of  a foreman and six labourers equipped with a tape-measure, a 
spirit level and a mattock and each person seemed to take it turn to work while 
the others commented, debated and discussed the inputs and outcomes relating 
to a donor-financed reinforced concrete water cistern on hospital premises.
The rapid development of  infrastructure by the Chinese is also potentially 
problematic because there is little political conversation at the local level. People 
seem not to be involved at any level of  planning. The best location for a road 
or a pipeline is not decided by the people who live nearest but by remote bureau-
crats. On the other side of  the coin, however, the Chinese live at a domestic level 
of  comfort – or discomfort – which is much closer to that of  their African neighbours 
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than is that of  the western expatriates who live increasingly fear-ridden lives 
entombed in razor-wire barricades. The Chinese managers, moreover, learn good 
Portuguese before coming to Angola which is not always true of  Anglophone 
expatriates who tend haughtily to expect their Lusophone opposite numbers to 
learn English.
We were unable to discuss the question of  Chinese clothing which has been 
so controversial in the European Union. We were told, however, that the Angolan 
textile and clothing industry has failed to revive owing to the large-scale importa-
tion of  second-hand western clothing which is hawked down every alley and 
by-way and sold from the central reservation of  urban streets in which the mon-
eyed classes spend much of  their day stranded in traffic jams of  monumental 
proportions. When the time comes to pay China for its multi-billion dollar lines 
of  credit most of  the payment will come from oil but one assumes that a market 
in manufactures – which inevitably depresses local productive initiative – is likely 
to be part of  the agreement.
Save the Children
Half  of  Angola’s twelve or more million people are children below the age of  
fifteen. They have had a raw deal. Among girls three quarters of  their time is 
spent in domestic or commercial work whereas the slightly more privileged boys 
gain better access to schooling and only spend one quarter of  their time on home 
chores or street trading. The traumas of  war, the intellectual consequences of  
malnourishment, the loss of  parents mown down by cholera or TB, and weakened 
immune systems ravaged by HIV, all take their toll on child welfare. Against this 
background one of  our most heartening experiences was quietly sneaking into the 
hall behind the great Methodist church in Luanda to listen to a choir of  seven-
year-olds singing their hearts out in Portuguese, Kimbundu and – rather more 
surprisingly – Kikongo.
One of  our hosts and sponsors was the British Save the Children Fund. They 
took us to see the way in which street theatre is being used in Angola to heighten 
AIDS awareness. Young adolescents, watched by their juniors as well as their 
seniors, dramatised the nature of  courting, the pressures which older men with 
money and status put on school girls to have clean sex with them, the risks of  
unprotected intercourse, and the proper way of  rolling on a condom. British 
politicians were fascinated by the vitality, energy and humour of  the acting. One 
of  the messages which was put across was that HIV infection is not something 
that takes place “out there” in the big bad city, or among immoral foreigners 
coming across the borders, but something that we have here in our rural midst. 
No one knows what the infection rates are in Angola but the official figure of  
about 4% is probably an underestimate. Three years ago a figure of  8% was 
based on the maternity statistics of  Luanda hospitals.
Protecting children also involves protecting parents and the Save the Children 
staff  in Huambo took us to the HIV unit attached to the provincial hospital. The 
testing and counselling room has scarcely room for a desk and two chairs but is 
staffed by a Catholic nun who is a qualified doctor. She interviews about seven 
people a day (from a population of  over a million in the province) and sometimes 
as many as two of  them turn out to be HIV positive. The fund is financing the 
 angola 2006: a british parliamentary visit 231
building of  a purpose-built annexe to the hospital and one can but hope that it 
will be as intensively used as the cramped old premises and not become another 
of  the dream projects with which Angola is littered. In Luanda a shining new 
AIDS research facility has been built but has no staff  to run it.
Capacity Building
Visiting the oil companies, both the harbour facilities of  the state’s Sonangol and 
the borrowed De Beers offices used by Britain’s BP, brought home to us just how 
scarce qualified personnel are in Angola. The obvious shortage is of  staff  who 
can communicate with the wider world in English when Angola is a closed enclave 
of  the Lusophone world. But more critically, Angola does not have the capacity 
to train and educate its people. The Agostinho Neto University has a course in 
engineering, but this produces only 40 graduates each year. Angola’s oil and dia-
mond extractive industries only employ one per cent of  the country’s population 
and yet personnel is acutely scarce and Angola has a catastrophic deficit in human 
capacity. Oil company personnel have often been trained in Anglophone southern 
Africa with the technical courses available in Durban being a favourite. But it is 
not only technical qualifications which are scarce. All forms of  private and pub-
lic administration run very slowly – a former employee of  the Aberdeen chamber 
of  commerce had to spend two hours just paying the bill for his rental car. 
International companies, non-governmental agencies, government ministries, the 
four great oil companies, all try to poach each others’ competent middle level 
managers to meet the requirement to Angolanise.
Providing a salary, accommodation, medical insurance and travel for an expa-
triate in Angola is expensive, at least $600,000 per annum. The country’s dozen-
odd private institutions of  higher education have by and large no permanent 
staff  – and sometimes no permanent premises either – but they buy in hourly-
paid teaching from across the whole range of  available expertise, both Angolan 
and expatriate. One of  the exemplary British projects in Angola is the Crown 
Agents’ scheme to improve the takings of  the Luanda Customs House. Efficiency 
and probity are the new concepts that have been introduced – despite some early 
foot-dragging by those who might otherwise have hoped to take a cut by “facili-
tating” clearance through the revenue agencies. More inputs are needed, however, 
and although revenue is now much improved speed is not. The oil companies 
– who have built their own half-mile of  new dock-side quays on reclaimed land 
– have privileged priorities but other import-export businesses are accustomed to 
waiting weeks or even months to gain access to their shipments. This is a serious 
disincentive to foreign entrepreneurs and investors. So too is the lack of  bureau-
cratic competence in the government offices which still have to issue fourteen 
different licences before a company can be registered. A World Bank record in 
obstructionism we were informed.
No Representation without Taxation
In countries such as Angola where revenue is centrally collected, from customs 
duty or oil royalties, and not paid by citizens out of  income, there is very little 
popular pressure on government to improve services or else beware of  voter wrath. 
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Hence the clever inversion of  the Boston tea party slogan that one hears in Africa: 
no representation without taxation. The idea that the government is not account-
able to the people is one that British parliamentary visitors find completely baffling. 
In Angola you do not need to curry favour with income tax payers because, to 
all intents and purposes, there are no income tax payers. Ninety per cent of  
government revenue comes from the oil companies direct (give or take a little 
leakage which strict government rules of  confidentiality try to mask). Although 
the government is gradually increasing public spending, with current spending on 
health and education reaching 75 dollars a head, the preferred development model 
is for prestige projects such as the Sonangol building from which ordinary Angolans 
will see very little immediate benefit.
The question of  political responsibility becomes even more difficult to grasp 
when members of  the British House of  Commons (and even those in the Lords) 
have to recognise that no Angolan has a member of  parliament to whom he or 
she can turn for redress in the event of  government malpractice. Voting in 
Angola – as in the European Union – is by party list which effectively means that 
all MPs are anonymous. None can be lobbied and none can be de-selected. 
Members of  the national assembly are beholden to their party managers rather 
than to their multi-member constituencies. A member of  a civil society group 
noted that in Angola there are no citizenship rights, there are only “constitutional 
rights”, but nobody knows what these constitutional rights are. As national assem-
bly members are apparently unaccountable to ordinary citizens, it is necessary to 
ask the question: who will protect the rights of  Angolans?
The matter of  political accountability became even more bizarre when we 
moved from interviewing constituents to interviewing the speaker of  the Angolan 
parliament. He assumed that his role was to defend the government record rather 
than defend the interests of  grass roots citizens. He took this responsibility very 
seriously and gave us an intelligent eight-point plan of  action for the MPLA 
(without, incidentally, mentioning its sleeping coalition partner which provides a 
few Unita ministers or vice-ministers and one or two provincial governors). Roberto 
de Almeida did not see himself  as the people’s watchdog in the way that his 
guests had anticipated that he would.
Centralisation and Decentralisation
Travelling through the country enabled us to realise just how subtly subversive 
the concept of  community development is in a country which has experienced a 
hundred years of  tightly centralised government by the freemasons of  the Portuguese 
republic, by the Catholic generals of  the forty “fascist” years, by the ideologues 
of  the Marxist command economy and now by the proponents of  what the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s erstwhile correspondent wickedly called “jungle 
capitalism”. Everyone in Angola who needs resources now looks not to his or her 
provincial governor, nor to his or her departmental minister, nor even to the office 
of  the ever-changing prime minister, but to the palace, the Futungo de Belas, 
where the state president has his offices. That is where budgets are finally decided. 
During a lively visit to the faculty of  agriculture’s research station in Huambo we 
asked about the budget and were told that it had been fixed for 2007 at the same 
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cash level as for 2006. This means a cut of  about 15 per cent in real terms. We 
were also led to believe that other social budget heads such as health and basic 
education were not likely to match – let alone exceed – the current level of  
inflation.
All talk of  decentralising the system may yet be a premature. If  an election 
were to be called, for instance in 2008 after a gap of  sixteen years, decentralisa-
tion would be a popular platform. But the fear is regularly expressed that decen-
tralisation is merely a policy to blind foreigners into admiration and that once 
the election has been held the hundred-year-old tradition of  centralised power 
would quickly be restored.
The Ministry for Territorial Administration is responsible for both the reform 
of  local administration and for the preparation of  election procedures. No local 
autonomy has been attempted since the impact of  war, the lack of  infrastructure, 
and the absence of  any historical precedent made devolution seem impossible. 
The provinces are run in true colonial style by “governors” appointed by the 
president. The ministry’s aim is fist of  all to “consolidate” this centralised admin-
istration and only then to risk devolving any share of  power to regional bodies. 
United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations nevertheless continue 
to advocate the introduction of  local government, at least in the municipalities. 
So far the government’s commitment to decentralisation is targeted on “selected” 
municipalities. This promised trial, however, will only be initiated after the long 
awaited parliamentary and presidential elections have taken place.
Publish What You Pay or the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative
If  the oil industry in Angola is secretive, the diamond industry is ultra-secretive, 
and all other extractive industries are but a distant memory of  Portuguese colonial 
myths. (The latest hot gossip says that work has stopped on the $2 billion new 
airport because the Chinese front-end loaders discovered that they were digging 
up diamonds; such stories were always rife in Portuguese days as people dreamt 
of  quick riches.) Until recently the government was very keen to hold on to the 
tradition of  secrecy and even now BP is quite cautious about revealing figures to 
inquisitive members of  parliament. It once burnt it fingers badly by trying to push 
the door of  openness a little harder and faster than rival oil giants (or African 
regimes) were willing to tolerate. Now, however, it is public knowledge that a 
licence to explore in one of  the deep-water blocks cost about $1,000 million dol-
lars and that a community development supplement of  about $100 million is 
added to each licence.
Chevron pioneered the concept of  putting some of  its resources into commu-
nity development projects and BP is following the same line on a smaller scale. 
This does raise the serious philosophical question as to whether private investment 
in community development allows government to play down its own responsibili-
ties. Should not oil royalties to the ministry of  finance be used more extensively 
for development policies rather than held back for use in priorities dear to the 
elite. In the past the problem of  underfunding programmes for the poor was 
compounded by leakage of  oil revenues from the public purse to private 
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pockets – one former IMF assessment put the leakage at $800 million dollars a 
year – but transparency has greatly improved since then. Still, however, the 
presidency prefers to obtain expensive credit from China with no strings attached 
rather than meet the conditionalities of  the IMF in the hope of  cheaper loans. 
But if  transparency has been improved on the signature bonuses with their com-
munity development supplements the same cannot be said of  the profit sharing 
arrangements.
Land Mines and Unexploded Ordinance
Several districts in Angola are full of  landmines. During the times of  war eleven 
armies laid landmines across Angola and virtually none of  the mine-fields was 
mapped to facilitate post-war clearance programmes. Nor is there any prospect 
that the armies that laid them will be willing to help finance the huge cost of  
identification and destruction of  mines and other ordinance.
In 2003 an all-party group from London visited the remote Moxico province 
and spent half  a day with MAG, the Mines Advisory Group, witnessing the skill 
and professionalism of  Angola’s mine disposal experts some of  whom had learnt 
their craft in places as far away as Cambodia and Afghanistan. Destroying ordi-
nance is an expensive business and if  any help is required in securing the future 
funding of  MAG or other operations it should urgently be given.
The 2006 visitors were shown the installations of  the Halo Trust by its Scottish 
commander-in-chief  and once again were hugely impressed by the professionalism 
of  the operation and overwhelmed by the magnitude and cost of  the task still 
ahead. Funding is now largely carried by Angola’s own budget with a great 
improvement in efficiency since external funding by the European Union and the 
United Nations had proved to be laboriously slow. Halo is responsible for four 
provinces one of  which contains some of  Angola’s prime agricultural land. Progress 
on the land-mine front, like progress on the community development front, was 
distinctly cheering.
The Luanda Chamber of  Commerce and the Angola Agency for 
Private Investment
The two business institutions which we visited presented a rather sharp contrast 
to one another. The chamber of  commerce, a shabby office up two sets of  well-
worn colonial stairs, perplexed our parliamentarians. Perhaps this was the voice of  
the marginalised, even perhaps the voice of  businessmen affiliated to parties of  the 
opposition. But no, their office was in an old ministry of  the interior government 
building which they shared with the fiscal police, the arm of  government which 
tries to restrict, or benefit from, the informal market sector. The chamber has 
affiliated members and is even linked to small business cells in the provinces. But 
when overseas investors were asked about the Luanda chamber of  commerce they 
coyly suggested that it was an institution which they preferred to by-pass.
The agency for private investment presented a totally different image. The 
premises were centrally located and ultra-modern, the chairman was as sharply 
suited as any state president, the information was impeccably presented by power-
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point using the most expensive technology. Money swills about in Luanda with 
unbelievable opulence and the delegation were deeply affected by the contrast 
between the musseque quarters in which real people live and the mirrored corridors 
of  power of  which the investment agency was a prime example.
Food Security
“There are countries that do not have diamonds but which are better off  than 
we are because they have agriculture.” Agriculture was often spoken of  as Angola’s 
silver hope. The current food deficit is 54%, and imported food puts an increas-
ing burden on the cost of  living of  struggling people. Agriculture could provide 
jobs for millions of  unemployed and underemployed Angolans whose parents were 
once subsistence farmers. With policies geared to marketing, transport, seed sup-
ply, and fertilizer distribution the country could return to its former status as an 
exporter of  food to the Central African region. A tiny faculty of  agricultural and 
veterinary sciences is working to boost Angola’s agricultural capacity and train 
extension workers in the Central Highlands. One policy is to re-introduce local 
seed and so diminish dependency on foreign genetically modified seed which is 
loaded with disadvantages for small scale subsistence farmers. Until a more urgent 
priority is given to revitalising the agrarian provinces, however, Angola is going 
to suffer real hardship. In 2006 the World Food Programme could only raise 19 
of  the 90 million dollars it required to feed 700,000 Angolans who had no access 
to domestic food supplies. Of  these 220,000 are children enrolled in school feed-
ing programmes. The United Nations is no longer able to feed nursing mothers 
or victims of  tuberculosis. There are probably still 80,000 Angolan refugees living 
in neighbouring countries and past repatriation schemes have been supplied with 
flour, beans, oil and salt by a programme which is now closing down. In November 
2006 the UN-funded air bridges which had supplied food to zones of  acute mal-
nutrition were withdrawn while the long-term government-funded programme of  
road transport restoration was in its infancy.
The Meaning of  Corruption
One of  the most delicate questions which a visiting politician must ask is “how 
far is ‘corruption’ a problem which is barring the road to prosperity and democ-
racy?” The government has ratified the conventions on corruption of  both the 
United Nations and also the African Union, yet defining corruption is not easy 
since it covers a whole gamut of  influence peddling, embezzlement, and payment 
for services which ought to be free. Policemen are not well paid in Angola and 
the normal fee for passing a road check is 50 Kwanzas (35 pence). One suspects 
that a nurse might charge the same for bringing a bedpan to a bedridden patient. 
Further up the scale, members of  the kleptocracy can earn good money by help-
ing importers and exporters to expedite their business while delays and scandals 
in the docks fill the columns of  the independent press. Opportunities for palm 
greasing appear to prevail and a spokesman for the MPLA, while not addressing 
the question of  corruption at ministerial level, did talk of  corruption relating to 
bureaucracy. The government is hoping to raise public administration salaries to 
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deter illegitimate activity and some cases of  petty corruption that have been 
investigated and are now in the hands of  the attorney general.
For British visitors to ask questions about the privatisation of  public assets – what 
Harold Macmillan described as the selling off  of  the family silver – is a little 
delicate since African politicians would probably see themselves as loyal followers 
of  the dictates of  the Thatcher Foundation. The independent Angolan newspapers 
would not see it that way, however, and a week before our arrival the front-page 
headline on one paper said “The Eduardo dos Santos Foundation is a canker at 
the heart of  government.” A free press can be very critical of  the all-powerful 
head of  state, though the story on the inside pages was an old one written by a 
distinguished, but now deceased, French political scientist.3 Even the more sober 
weeklies do not hesitate to point the finger at high-flying entrepreneurs:
“One day José Eduardo dos Santos will have to explain the byways through which 
his adult descendents passed to erect the enterprises which they now own and expla-
nations will then have to be extended to other members of  the clique currently in 
power.”
In another impertinent story a fine picture of  the president’s daughter carried the 
caption “Isabel’s finger-prints are beginning to be seen in the banking sector”.
The links between money and power were illustrated in a story published on 
the day of  our arrival. The firm of  José Veríssimo Ltd which digs gravel and red 
sand at Macesso near Cabala recently paid the state $10,000 for a quarrying 
licence but has now discovered a large Chinese-operated digger and four heavy-
duty tipper trucks stealing aggregate from the concession at night The Chinese 
foreman, Mr Young, drove a Nissan with the markings of  the Gabinete de Reconstrução 
Nacional and the workers were protected by soldiers of  the presidential household 
guard. The triangle of  presidential guards, the office of  national reconstruction, 
and Chinese entrepreneurs is normally dominated by General Hélder Vieira Dias, 
known by his nom de guerre of  “Kopelipa”. Such stories form the context for the 
question which Britain’s visiting parliamentarians constantly asked: “Does corrup-
tion cause problems in Angola and if  so what are the potential cures?”
Cabinda, the elusive Eighteenth Province
Another delicate question which our visiting politicians asked was “and what about 
Cabinda?” The answer on the front page of  one of  the weeklies we trawled was 
“Cabinda peace deal – an act of  Strip-Tease”. Forty per cent of  Angola’s oil 
comes from shallow-water wells whose huge gas flares can be seen off  the shore 
of  the former Portuguese enclave squeezed between ex-French and ex-Belgian 
Congo. Various factions of  local politics try to argue that the province does not 
belong to Angola and that Portugal should belatedly give it its independence in 
the manner of  East Timor, an Asian colony that was temporarily swallowed up 
by Indonesia for twenty-five years after the collapse of  the Portuguese empire. 
The strip-tease involves peeling off  layers of  political influence in the enclave and 
giving politicians of  greater or lesser influence and credibility seats at the mad 
3 See C. Messiant, L’Angola postcolonial, Paris, Karthala, 2008-2009, 2 vols.
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hatter’s tea party in Luanda. Bringing Unita in from the cold did eventually end 
the war on the Angolan mainland and the assumption must be that a deal with 
Cabindans ought to be possible if  the price is right. But 40 per cent of  one and 
a half  million barrels of  oil a day (worth $60 a barrel) is a lot of  price. And 
watchful foreign neighbours might be willing to keep the pot on the boil in the 
hope of  gaining a share of  the spoils. The matter remains delicate and one brave 
journalist – later arrested by security police at Cabinda airport – claimed that the 
Cabindan signatory to a peace accord between Cabinda’
“ ‘Forum for Democracy’ and the Luanda government had no local legitimacy and, 
moreover, were wanted by Interpol in the United States. The journalist was also 
accused of  writing words ‘injurious to the reputation of  the President of  the 
Republic.’ ”
The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme
Politically this is the most important project to receive British funding. It is designed 
to create models of  community self-reliance within the urban sphere of  Luanda 
and to influence government policies and practices in key areas related to urban 
poverty. It aims to empower “the people” in a country where, for the last hundred 
years, citizens have assume that anything that is not done by the government – or 
on the instruction of  the government – is liable to be illegal. This empowerment 
project is not only radical in terms of  challenging the politics of  centralisation 
but is also radical in that authority is being put into the hands of  women as well 
as of  men.
Although Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (Lupp) has been working in sev-
eral sectors, one of  the vehicles for giving people the confidence to take respon-
sibilities into their own hands is focussed – as an example which might later be 
adopted and adapted in other spheres of  local politics – on local water supplies. 
Water had been a key issue of  controversy in Luanda since the seventeenth cen-
tury. Until the early twentieth century water was brought down from the Bengo 
River by sea-going canoes but it is now brought by tanker lorries which negotiate 
the perilous mud lanes between the shanties to sell water very expensively by the 
gallon.
The city water supply, which delivers purified water erratically but virtually 
cost-free to the paved sections of  the old inner city, is being expanded and extended 
to build a network of  stand pipes (or stand posts) in the unpaved musseque com-
munes. A network of  4,000 stand posts will eventually be needed for the four 
million new urban dwellers who have now settled permanently on the fringes of  
the old city of  400,000 inhabitants.
The Lupp has enabled 73 odd stand pipes to be built over five years. Each 
has a water management committee responsible for security, for maintenance and 
for the collection of  revenue charges which are about one tenth of  the price of  
the water delivered by the lorry entrepreneurs of  the “wild economy”. The com-
mittees are linked in communal level associations which provide solidarity and 
protection against possible inimical interference by politicians with private enterprise 
ambitions. Leaders chosen to represent each committee receive three months of  
training. When a problem arises an association can deal directly with the water 
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provincial provider. Each committee is training personnel capable of  solving some 
of  the small technical problems associated with standpipes, a huge advance in the 
concept of  self-reliance. Organised residents are now able to work on sanitation 
projects and joint street and rubbish clearing. The programme has resulted in the 
initiation of  a culture of  engagement and participation in the hope that local 
authorities will consult each community before making policy decisions.
Funding agencies should note at this point that the evolution of  civil society 
in the communes in which Lupp is active has not been spontaneous and indig-
enous but has been sponsored by international humanitarian organizations. They 
therefore still need time to foster their sense of  compete independence from their 
international progenitors.
Poverty reduction is the primary aim of  the Lupp which draws on the strengths 
of  CARE, One World Action, Save the Children, and Development Workshop 
all working under the umbrella of  Britain’s Department for International 
Development. A previous APPG visited the project’s activities in Cacuaco, where 
survival in the all-important “informal” sector of  commerce and artisanship was 
assisted by micro-credit schemes and in Kilamba Kiaxi where garbage collection 
and community lavatories were the projects designed to enhance municipal pride 
and participatory democracy. The 2006 visit went to two projects in Cazenga to 
see poverty reduction strategies at work on the ground. Lupp is very effectively 
testing models and methods of  urban poverty reduction, helping local community 
organisations to collaborate with local municipal and communal government, 
facilitating dialogue with wider civil society organisations as well as with central 
government ministries, and not least creating crèches and consumer cooperatives 
to help women citizens. We were unable to see the poster campaign for com-
munity development which the Luanda provincial government had agreed to 
sponsor at the suggestion of  Development Workshop – our twenty-five-year-old 
host agency which has so successfully pursued the policy of  “engaging in prefer-
ence to criticising” when inching administrators forward.
One question which has to be asked is whether a scheme pioneered in two of  
the northern municipalities of  the city is now sufficiently robust to stand on its 
own feet and generate the intended multiplier effect. The answer is a unfortunately 
no, it is not. A few more years of  experimentation are still needed. As will be 
explained in a later paragraph, success has been dramatic but a small, externally 
funded, audit role and umbrella of  political protection is still required. Bilateral 
aid to Angola is slowly being withdrawn. The logical assumption is that with such 
considerable oil wealth, this country could not possibly be in need of  much aid. 
Angola, however, has had only four years of  peace, a peace which is not yet fully 
consolidated. It has a thirty year gap in its history to catch up on and the fact 
that the country ranks second from worst in the world for under-five mortality 
shows that oil is not necessarily the whole answer. Bilateral aid can be considered 
superior to aid channelled through large donor institutions whose sizeable bureau-
cracies can cause delay and expense.
Urban Land Tenure
While DFID, the British ministry for international development, has been sponsor-
ing the introduction of  the concept of  democracy into the local government of  
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the municipalities of  Luanda, Christian Aid has been exploring the possibility of  
applying the rule of  law to the field of  city land tenure. Each policy would 
essentially be a first for Angola.
When Luanda underwent a ten-fold expansion – during the thirty post-colonial 
years of  civil and interventionist warfare – pressures on land became intense. The 
old city does possess a colonial land register but access to it is so cumbersome 
that none but the most dedicated of  legal beavers can find the relevant entries. 
In practice registered land, and the tenure of  high-rise apartments, was “nation-
alised” during the austere Marxist decade of  1975 to 1985 and then “privatised” 
during the free-market decade of  1985-1995. During the colonial period the 
ownership of  rental properties was overwhelmingly in the hands of  senior army 
officers managing the expeditionary force from Portugal. In the cidade asfaltada of  
central Luanda that tradition seems to have been inherited by the senior officers 
of  the national army.
In suburban and peri-urban Luanda land tenure is governed by community 
convention and tradition. The early twentieth-century African housing in the lower 
middle-class suburbs was build with brick walls, tiled roofs and proud little gardens. 
The peri-urban additions built of  concrete blocks with zinc roofs, are less elegant 
but none-the-less substantial. Both types, however, impede the expansion of  the 
rampant commercial sector fuelled by high oil prices and almost unlimited Chinese 
lines of  credit. The government believes that it owns the land. The result has 
been conflict over land which has been almost as shocking as the suburban land-
clearances orchestrated by Robert Mugabe’s so-called “veterans” in Zimbabwe, 
this despite the fact that the Angolan government has ratified the UN Habitat 
Convention. Angolan citizens can in theory obtain paper title but they only have 
been given only three years in which they may do so. To gain such a legal title, 
however, they must first obtain an identity card which can itself  take up to two 
years.
The problem of  defending the rights of  householders to retain their properties 
at a time of  rampant business development is acute. One briefing paper that was 
given to us on our arrival summed up the issues that confront the legal system 
thus
“Many seats on the Supreme Court remain vacant and a Constitutional Court, autho-
rised by law in 1992, has not yet been established. In addition, the courts are crippled 
by the war and are perceived ineffective and untrustworthy by the few have access to 
them.”
The system lacks the resource and independence to play an effective role and the 
legal framework is obsolete; much of  the criminal and commercial code reflecting 
the colonial era with modifications from the Marxist era.
The more crude, if  well-connected, developers in Luanda do not even pretend 
to search for legal ownership rights but pay armed policemen to issue eviction 
orders at the point of  a gun. Some families who find themselves out on the street 
have traditional rights extending back over several generations. What they lack is 
title, or a document saying they have ownership of  the land, a document which 
any government minister or army general can readily obtain. Other families find 
that their entire stock of  financial assets, and their business creditworthiness, can 
be bulldozed to rubble overnight. Some breathing space in the process of  land 
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evictions might have been gained by the oxygen of  international publicity which 
Amnesty International was able to provide. A civil society group, SOS Habitat, 
is also working to defend human rights specifically related to land and shelter. 
The group looks to raise the profile of  the vulnerable peri-urban communities. 
But if  one asks the average Luandan what the greatest threat to human rights is 
in the city the answer is always the same: it is the police who threaten us 
most.
Christian Aid is the Robin Hood of  the international development agencies. 
Three years ago it hired Joseph Fiennes to demonstrate to first world television 
audiences the reality of  poverty in the third world, as witnessed in Angola. But 
why, asked our Presbyterian peer, does the Angolan government – wedded as it 
is to wealth creation and the empowerment of  the élite – desist from having this 
intrepid Protestant NGO drummed out of  the Luanda forest. Christian radicalism, 
with a little protection from foreign publicity, takes on a dangerous role in Angola 
when defending human rights and supporting poverty alleviation.
Christian Aid works with a variety of  partners in Angola with the aim of  
strengthening their ability to respond to the needs, rights and aspirations of  poor 
Angolans and then share their experience with the government of  Angola. 
Marginalised women and impoverished men are helped to hold decision-makers 
to account. Access to resources and the prevention of  epidemics, including the 
AIDS epidemic, are key components of  the programmes. During the recent chol-
era outbreak (which may have killed a thousand people in Luanda alone) the 
community bulletin Ecos da Henda advised slum-dwellers to bury their dead imme-
diately without first washing the corpse – such is the level of  detail in which 
NGOs can get involved. In the search for civic education programmes and lead-
ership capacity-building it is local churches and local organisations (including trade 
unions, lobbying groups, charities, human rights groups and business associations) 
who are the key partners both in the dozen impoverished municipalities of  Greater 
Luanda and in the rural provinces which have so far made few steps in the 
recovery from war. Christian Aid’s emphasis so far is on Uíge province in the 
north-west (which was once the heartland of  the opposition of  FNLA, Kuando 
Kubango in the south-east (where Unita had its first and its last military bases) 
and Kwanza Sul, a once-rich coffee-growing district, not far from Luanda, which 
has attracted the attention of  the new class of  absentee black settlers. The British 
parliamentary delegation was able to meet several of  Christian Aid’s impressive 
partners.
We were not able to meet the Angolan association for justice, peace and democ-
racy but their report (unfortunately only available in Portuguese) touched on many 
of  our concerns. Prison reform comes top of  the agenda and reports on the 
conditions in the Luanda gaols do not make savoury reading even if  some of  the 
accounts of  physical punishments and deprivations are selected for their dramatic 
impact. Legal reform is also one of  the urgent demands of  the association which 
points out that sexual abuse does not feature in the Angola canon of  criminal 
behaviour. Among the victimisations which are highlighted are the ostracism of  
HIV carriers against whom prejudice is very strong. The freedom of  the press is 
now better than it ever was in Portuguese colonial times but protecting the free-
dom of  expression can still be a risk. The case of  the Cabinda peace process is 
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a particularly sensitive issue and the journalist who was arrested in the province 
on 30 September 2006 was held for a month to warn him off  criticising govern-
ment policy.
Farmers and Rural Development
The oldest international development agency in Angola is the Development 
Workshop and is has worked for over a quarter of  a century with non-govern-
mental organisations and with ministries of  international development, including 
the British and Canadian ones. While Angola’s central government concentrates 
its energies on the third of  the national population which now lives in and around 
the city of  Luanda, the development agencies do not neglect the sixteen other 
mainland provinces in which the war-time legacies of  poverty, illiteracy and disease 
are at least as acute as they are in the urban slums.
On the plateau of  the central highlands farmers face a legal time-bomb. Their 
traditional legal rights of  usufruct – land use – are not recognised by the national 
government which is sternly wedded to the bureaucratic concepts of  paper docu-
mentation which it inherited from the old “fascist” regime of  1940s colonialism. 
Farmers, primarily women but also men, have therefore been told that if  they do 
not obtain paper title to their holdings, and also put up permanent rather than 
temporary farm buildings, they will be at risk of  land expropriation for the benefit 
of  absentee landlords who will come up from the lowland cities with government-
approved paper titles.
Farmers who have neither the required identity cards nor the necessary literacy 
skills to begin the process of  registering land claims are being given help as 
Development Workshop enables them to survey and measure their properties. This 
might be a first step to registering a claim in written law, as opposed to oral law, 
or it might give them leverage in negotiating the exchange of  an existing plot for 
a comparable one elsewhere which administrators are more willing to release to 
the peasant sector.
Two completely contrasted opinions were given by witnesses to the highland 
agricultural scene. One said that the highlands were not sufficiently fertile to attract 
the attention of  ex-generals and others who were anxious to rapidly enhance their 
post-war incomes by gaining private title to public land resources. The second 
opinion said that, on the contrary, it was the city bourgeois of  the lowlands who 
were the greatest threat to the well-being of  highland farmers. An independent 
journalist speculated that the number of  former generals who were playing the 
field in the “wild” real estate market both in the city and in the provinces was 
more than five hundred. The group was told one story of  a family who for gen-
erations had farmed cassava on a piece of  land and used its mango trees for 
shade and fruit. When they recently went to check their crop after an absence 
of  three days, they were denied access and told by the police that they could no 
longer grow food there.
There is also the issue of  returning refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Those who decide to return to their land may now find it farmed by another 
family. No solution is offered centrally on how to resolve these conflicts. There is 
also the problem of  clashing economic interests when pastoral farmers encroach 
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upon land dedicated to arable farming. With the government trying to create large 
plantation-style farms in some provinces, the peasants of  Angola worry about their 
future. We came across an interesting example of  one northern region where 
colonial land expropriation had formerly been devoted to ranching and which 
is now being restored to its old settler-type economy by new urban investors 
bringing in Charolais beef  cattle. We had no opportunity to see how well this 
was being matched to the interests and aspirations of  the local crop-farming 
community.
National Identity
The question of  national identity and of  xenophobia was at the top of  the 
political agenda during our visit. The president made a much publicised speech 
to announce that Portuguese was not merely the “official” language of  Angola 
but also the “national” language of  Angola. One third of  the population, he said, 
spoke Portuguese as their mother-tongue, as the language of  social intercourse, 
and not merely the language of  employment. The vernaculars, he said, presented 
problems of  national identification since some of  them were spoken across the 
national boundaries by foreigners. Up-grading fluency in Portuguese was the order 
of  the day and eighty television journalists were outraged to be told that they 
would have to present themselves to the Catholic University of  Luanda to be 
examined in language competence. Fifty of  them refused and risked losing their 
jobs while senior editors gained exemption by claiming that it would undermine 
their dignity to sit in an examination hall with their juniors. The foreigners with 
whom elite Angolans feel truly at home are the Brazilians and the Portuguese – “our 
cousins” as the national football team explained in Germany when drawn to play 
against their former colonial masters in the World Cup. But realists in the world 
of  business recognise that English is the language of  the future and that the 
xenophobic fear of  Anglo-Saxons (and of  Afro-Saxons) has to be overcome. The 
great ogre for some Angolans is South Africa and although Angola nominally 
belongs to Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADC) no 
move towards economic integration in the southern African region is anticipated 
for the next ten years. The anxieties about South African business penetration is 
perhaps most sharply felt by the new generation of  Unita generals who are begin-
ning to get their feet under the table of  the ownership class. It is they who most 
stridently fear the post-apartheid generation of  black entrepreneurs who would 
like a slice of  Angola’s contracts in construction, telecoms, banking and the other 
booming sectors fuelled by high oil prices and soaring levels of  well-head 
production.
In the matter of  identity sport is a major political issue in Angola. A basketball 
team came home from a tournament in Japan to be welcomed with cash gifts of  
quarter of  million dollars from the army chief  of  staff  and a telecoms entrepre-
neur. Even more bizarrely Angola still has a national team which – like the old 
colonial Portuguese – plays hockey on roller-skates in the absence of  ice. But far 
more significantly ten million Lusophone Angolans have just eclipsed a hundred 
million Nigerian Afro-Saxons by winning the right to host the next African Cup 
of  Nations. To make this dream a reality hundreds of  millions of  government 
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money will have to be invested in football stadia, tarred roads, night-clubs and 
hotel bedrooms. This sporting coup is probably more important to the government 
than any kudos it might gain from holding a country-wide general election. Indeed 
one cheeky observer thought that the prospect of  “an election in two years time” 
which has been on the table since the 2002 cease-fire would now have to be put 
on hold until after the Africa Cup since the managerial capacity to deal with 




4 D. Birmingham, Empire in Africa: Angola and its Neighbours, Athens, Ohio University Press, 
2006, contains other essays which might illuminate some of  the issues in this article.
